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Sovereignty and asserting the power of the people were unusually prominent 
themes in the news in 2016. While the title of Daniel Lee’s book suggests a purely 
historical focus, the author is an assistant professor in political science and makes 
references to important wider issues in political science at appropriate points. 
Consequently it would be a pity if this book were read only by historical specialists. 
There is much of value here for political scientists wishing to look beyond purely 
modern literature, those interested in the interaction between law and political 
thought, and intellectual history more generally.  
 
The book covers a range of writers on the boundary of legal and political thought, 
ranging from medieval civilians to Thomas Hobbes, in more or less chronological 
order. Most are well-known in their fields. For all these writers Lee stresses the role 
of Roman law language, concepts and ideas in their ideas and theories of 
sovereignty and in shaping the terms of discussion (providing a ‘grammar’ as Lee 
puts it) in debates on sovereignty more generally, through to the modern day.  
 
This is not an easy book, but it contains much good material worth making the effort 
to find. Legal material and arguments derived from it can be complex. Lee navigates 
through the material well. There is some repetition in explaining points of Roman 
law in different chapters, but readers without much background in Roman law may 
find this helpful in reminding them of key legal concepts at appropriate points.  
 
Because the arguments of the various theorists were intricate and legalistic, much of 
the book is not directly about popular sovereignty, but early-modern sovereignty 
theory more generally, with popular sovereignty as a specific aspect of that wider 
idea. I suspect that Lee recognised this issue; the beginning of the discussion of Jean 
Bodin’s theory of popular sovereignty begins with a telling observation that the 
chapter has ‘finally’ reached Bodin’s theory of sovereignty in a popular state (p.217). 
This is not to say that the material about sovereignty more broadly is unwelcome or 
unhelpful. Quite the contrary. However, sometimes it only becomes clear how the 
wider discussion becomes relevant to issues of popular sovereignty at a late stage.  
Readers will need to be patient at times.  
 
This patience, though, itself reveals an important observation about ideas of popular 
sovereignty in medieval and early-modern Europe. While popular sovereignty is 
now largely taken for granted as an essential aspect of constituting political 
authority, this was emphatically not the case several centuries ago. Sovereignty itself 
was a contested idea, and popular sovereignty more contested still. Any claims as to 
its role had to be carefully justified. In a crucial respect, Lee’s book is about charting 
the development of European thought from this contestation to a more familiar (for 
modern readers) acceptance of popular sovereignty. By the later seventeenth century 
the idea that ‘the people’ necessarily had some sort of role in creating political 
authority was much more widely accepted, perhaps even dominant.  
 
This change is reflected by an important section in Chapter 9 (the final substantive 
chapter). It is only here that a significant question for popular sovereignty becomes a 
significant theme in the debate: who or what constituted ‘the people’ for popular 
sovereignty. Although Lee does not express this observation, the late emergence of 
this issue seems to reflect the change acceptability of the idea of popular sovereignty 
itself. Chapter 9 is concerned with ideas popular sovereignty in the first of the 
seventeenth century in England. By this point, popular sovereignty was increasingly 
acceptable and opponents challenged less the idea and more the possibility of its 
application, in part by querying whether it were ever possible for ‘the people’ to 
exercise (or have exercised) that sovereignty. 
 
Aside from the growing acceptance of popular sovereignty, there are two 
particularly important points to take from this book. Both of them arise at various 
points and are more observations on centuries of thinking and discussion than 
conclusions. Both, however, provoke further questions.  The first observation is the 
possibility of separating the idea of popular sovereignty from democracy. As Lee 
shows, in the discussion of popular sovereignty, and brought out with characteristic 
clarity by Jean Bodin, sovereignty was antecedent to the particular constitutional 
model of a particular state. For Bodin, sovereignty was definitional for a state, which 
could then choose from a range of possible models of government, which could be 
monarchical, oligarchical or popular. While Bodin did not insist upon sovereignty 
being popular, later theorists did, but accepted Bodin’s insight about constitutional 
structure.  
 
For these later theorists, the sovereign people could consequently establish 
institutions of government which were not democratic. They could even exercise 
their popular sovereignty to create a monarchy. In such a state all political authority 
derived ultimately from the people, even if the people could not themselves exercise 
political or governmental power. The people could, for example, create a form of 
state in which the popular will (frequently an object of terror to the early-modern 
elites, including many of the writers considered in this volume) could be resisted. To 
move outside of the particular points raised by the writers in the book, a sovereign 
people could, for example, create a system in which the popular will as enacted 
through democratic legislation might be blocked by an unelected legislative chamber 
or overturned by a court. Such actions would not be democratic, but they would be 
grounded in popular sovereignty.  
 
The second important observation is simply the importance of (Roman) law in the 
history of ideas of sovereignty, and more specifically popular sovereignty.  The 
medieval and early-modern writers were happy mixing ideas from public and 
private law, making this a complex set of texts. Lee is to be congratulated, in 
particular, for trying to engage with the legal material on its own terms, unlike some 
other writers in the history of political thought. Roman law was a crucial means for 
rendering ideas of sovereignty, and particularly popular sovereignty, acceptable.  
 
I thought the engagement with the legal ideas could have been taken further. For 
example, some theorists described the people as exercising their sovereignty but 
giving governmental power to an individual. They reached for Roman models to 
explain the relationships between the people and the governing individual. That 
individual could be described as standing in the position of a guardian to the people 
(and thereby owing them obligations, as in Roman law). Other theorists used the 
idea of usufruct, with the people as the ‘owner’ of sovereignty, and the government 
having the right to use it. But Roman law only allowed a limited range of perpetual 
guardianship, and usufructs could never be perpetual. Did these models then lead to 
requirements that at some point ‘the people’ would have to exercise their 
sovereignty again? This issue is only mentioned in relation to Johannes Althusius 
(p.237) and not directly linked to his Roman law ideas. The absence in the rest of the 
book left me uncertain whether the other theorists did not raise this issue, or Lee 
made a decision not to include it. This the absence of discussion provoked an 
interesting question: might this have been where the Roman law ideas manipulated 
by writers to develop their ideas of sovereignty broke down, and what might that 
tell us about how Roman law was and could be used in developing political ideas?  
 
Even more significant in relation to the use of Roman law, I thought an important 
question was begged and never addressed: why use legal material, language and 
ideas at all? This leads to a wider question about methodology for the authors being 
considered. Was legal material being used instrumentally, to justify conclusions 
reached (or sought) for other reasons, or did the legal material determine the 
conclusions? Lee never raises this issue, and it may be that different authors 
considered in the volume would yield different answers. A purely instrumental use 
of the civil law does not make the law unimportant, but perhaps renders it less 
important than if it drove the initial development of ideas. Nonetheless, Lee does 
demonstrate that even if the civil law was initially used instrumentally, it clearly did 
influence the ‘grammar’ (as Lee puts it) of later discourse. There are hints that Lee 
views the use of legal material as instrumental, used to justify or support existing 
ideas and developments (eg p.98, with the emergence of sovereignty theory reacting 
to the trend to ‘the centralization of public authority’), but if law were used 
instrumentally, why was law thought to be the suitable instrument? There are 
doubtless no simple answers to any of these questions. Nonetheless, Lees only 
demonstrates, but does not explain, the importance of Roman law which is an 
essential theme of the book. That is an important gap.  
 
A second omission is simply the wider context in which these theories, and uses of 
civilian ideas, occurred. While Lee discusses theorists who can be seen to make use 
of the civil law, he does not consider other possible sources for sovereignty ideas 
which may have been relevant to other early-modern theorists. What about other 
possible sources of political power? Divine right ideas receive very scant discussion 
(p.282), and theology is hardly mentioned (eg p.157). These were hardly 
unimportant intellectual influences in early-modern Europe and to overlook them 
almost entirely makes the claims about the importance of civil law appear one-sided.  
 
There are other, smaller, omissions which sometimes suggest a similar skewing of 
the argument to stress the civil law tradition and its practitioners at the expense of 
others. As a minor example, in the chapter on English developments, Lee begins by 
focusing particularly on two civilians, the Italian émigré Alberico Gentili and John 
Cowell. Lee makes much of John Cowell’s equation of prerogative with maiestas in 
his controversial 1607 work, The Interpreter (p.280). Nowhere does Lee mention that 
common lawyers, not civilians, had begun to refer to the maiestas of the monarch in 
the 1590s. I am not sure how this would affect the argument, but failing to mention it 
at all gives an impression of omissions which may be significant.  
 
There are minor quibbles and editorial concerns (especially near-contradictory 
statements, such as p.274, referring to early-modern England as ‘generally immune 
from the influence of civil law’ and p.275, where ‘Roman law made a considerable 
intellectual and social impact in England’; see also p.166 n.3 and 167). But these do 
not detract from the value of the many worthwhile points and observations in the 
book, which deserve to be considered by a wide range of readers.  
 
